Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law
Hofstra Law Faculty Scholarship

Summer 2012

Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies
Irina D. Manta
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Irina D. Manta, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 853 (2012)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/faculty_scholarship/74

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies
Irina D. Manta*
Trademark bullying has become a persistent problem, with
large companies intimidatingsmaller entities with cease and desist
campaigns and achieving anti-competitive results. A number of
tactics exist to deal with bullying behavior. One of them is the
imposition ofjudicial sanctions, but the standardsin that area are
unclear and the defendants often do not have the financial means
to engage in litigation at all. Other, extralegal measures such as
shaming have shown some success, but also present numerous
drawbacks and prove insufficient when used against powerful
actors. This article proposes a new model that draws on the
existing functions of the Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) to stem
the indiscriminate sending of cease and desist letters by large
trademark holders and incentivizes them to file their claims with
the PTO under certain conditions. This solution seeks to guard the
interests of legitimate victims of infringement while balancingtheir
rights with the need to protect smaller entities from the threat of
If the PTO could make preliminary
ruinous litigation.
determinations about the validity of infringement claims,
trademark owners could record evidence of policing while being
discouragedfrom makingfrivolous claims.

Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; Assistant Professor,
Case Western Reserve University School of Law; Yale Law School, J.D.; Yale College,
B.A. I would like to thank James Barabas, Eric Goldman, Hugh Hansen, Brian Lee,
Cassandra Robertson, Jeremy Sheff, David Silverman, Robert Wagner, and my research
assistant David Gerard. I am very grateful to Fordham Law School and the Fordham
IPLJ for inviting me to make this contribution and thank the symposium participants for
their comments. My appreciation also goes to Brooklyn Law School and its staff for
support during my research.
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INTRODUCTION

In the last few years, the phenomenon of "trademark bullying"
has begun to receive more attention in legal scholarship and the
media. Simply stated, a trademark bully is usually a large
company that seeks to put an end to behavior by individuals and
small businesses that it perceives as a danger to its own intellectual
property even though its legal claims against these other parties are
The bully puts its opponents under
spurious or non-existent.
pressure through "cease and desist" (C & D) letters in which it
demands that the opponent stop using a certain trademark that it
believes resembles its own and threatens legal sanctions if the C &
D demands are not met.2 These letters frequently do not contain
detailed explanations of the alleged infringement but instead are
intended to intimidate recipients into submission through the use of
vague claims masked in legalese and are sent by lawyers who
pressure recipients into providing a fast response.3 Individuals and

There is some anecdotal evidence of individuals bullying other individuals in this
manner, usually for purposes of extorting moderate sums of money as part of a
settlement. This piece will, however, mainly focus on the more typical Goliath-versusDavid kind of bullying.
2
See Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 Wis. L. REV. 625, 62829(2011).
Id; see also ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTIES: AUTHORSHIP, APPROPRIATION, AND THE LAW 66 (1998) (calling trademark

infringement claims a "ruse" that companies use to protect against competition).
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small businesses often capitulate rather than face a harrowing legal
battle that could bring them to the brink of financial destruction.
Trademark bullying engenders a number of costs for society.
First, the market suffers a reduction of legitimate competition. 4
The potential downsides of this effect are well-known and include
consequences such as higher prices for products and a reduced
panoply of choices in the marketplace. Relatedly, bullies create
obstacles for consumers' ability to make source-identification
connections with products that said consumers may wish to
purchase or that could benefit them.5 Second, bullying can
seriously inhibit not only commercial but also non-commercial
speech. While individuals are supposed to be able to make fair use
of trademarks, even fair use can at times encounter enforcement
efforts by way of C & D letters.6 One such case was when the
Lego Group sought to block use of the websites
"www.ratemylego.com" and "www.ratemylegos.com." 7 Some
have concluded that "[t]rademark law ... often serves as a blunt
instrument of cultural intimidation and censorship."8
A recent commercial example that involved a tenuous
trademark claim in which the alleged infringer did not cave has
been that of Bo Muller-Moore, a folk artist in Vermont who tried
to trademark the phrase "Eat More Kale" for his T-shirts only to
find himself facing an attack by Chick-fil-A and its mark "EAT
MOR CHIKIN."9 The C & D letter that Muller-Moore received
from the fast food giant accused him of "trademark infringement,
dilution, and unfair competition in violation of federal and state

Grinvald, supra note 2, at 650.
See, e.g., RONALD MICHMAN ET AL., LIFESTYLE MARKETING: REACHING THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSUMER 66-67 (2003) (describing the relationship between customers and
brands).
6 See Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism Conundrum,
4

28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1839-40 (2007).

Id. at 1840-41 (citations omitted).
8

DAVID

BOLLIER, BRAND

NAME

BULLIES: THE QUEST TO OWN AND CONTROL

CULTURE 84 (2005).

9
Jess Bidgood, Chicken Chain Says Stop, But T-Shirt Maker Balks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
5, 2011, at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/us/eat-more-kale-tshirts-challenged-by-chick-fil-a.html.
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law."' 0 There is no obvious link between chicken and kale, aside
from the fact that they are both food items. It is difficult to
envision a reasonable reading of the Lanham Act that would enable
Chick-fil-A to claim ownership of all variations of the phrase "Eat
More . . ." Lest one think that this claim was an isolated incident,

however, Chick-fil-A has also initiated legal proceedings or sent C
& D letters to a number of other owners of similar phrases,
including ones that encouraged individuals to eat more beer, fish,
goat, burritos, dog, moo, yogurt, ice cream, chocolate, cereal,
authentic, music, kosher, and treats." While at times, infringers
appropriate other elements of a trademark or trade dress in such a
way as to convey the same source as the original, this does not
appear to have been the case for Bo Muller-Moore. The dispute
between Muller-Moore and Chick-fil-A continues at the time of
this article, but for every Muller-Moore who receives publicity and
fights for his rights (by himself or aided by public interest
organizations), there are innumerable accused individuals who
quietly disappear.
At times, the alleged instances of infringement that owners
choose to pursue are downright strange, such as when the National
Pork Board (NPB), which owns the slogan "The Other White
Meat," went after a product that was actually an April Fool's joke.
The NPB sent a long C & D letter to ThinkGeek over an ad for
Canned Unicorn Meat because the ad contained the message: "Pat6
is pass6. Unicorn-the new white meat."' 2 ThinkGeek remarked
in a tongue-in-cheek comment: "We'd like to publicly apologize to
the NPB for the confusion over unicorn and pork-and for their
awkward extended pause on the phone after we had explained our
unicorn meat doesn't actually exist."' 3 While this incident is
Letter of Arnall, Golden, Gregory LLP to Daniel P. Richardson, Oct. 4, 2011, at 2,
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/74942618/Chick-fil-A-2011-C-D-Letter-OverEat-More-Kale.
io

1'

Id. at 5.

See Officially Our Best-Ever Cease and Desist, THINKGEEK (June 21, 2010),
http://www.thinkgeek.com/blog/2010/06/officially-our-bestever-cease.html.
13 Id. One would think that other elements of the ad, such as the promotion of the meat
as an "[e]xcellent source of sparkles" would have been a dead give-away. Id I would be
remiss not to further mention the recent C & D letter by one beer manufacturer against
another for the use of the term HOPASAURUS REX for a beer, to which the alleged
12
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amusing in many ways, it is also indicative of the knee-jerk
reactions of some trademark owners in the face of the slightest
perceived infringement.14 Indeed, the examples delineated here
only offer up a taste of the magnitude of the problem, and
"trademark holders often threaten to sue in cases which-at least in
the eyes of a person familiar with trademark law-would be
demonstrably frivolous."' 5 One of the tragic aspects of such
bullying is that the abuser is safe from punishment for his actions
because they take place outside of the jurisdiction of the judicial
system. Even though the conduct occurs in a private forum, the
bully is able to use the threat of litigation in a court that will at
times favor him and exact onerous expenses from the defendant.
Thus, the potential involvement of the judicial system becomes a
sword wielded against the victim, while the bully simultaneously
infringer responded by explaining that it had not sold beer under that name and adding
"PS: Please enjoy this drawing of a T-Rex waiving [sic] white flags, which was
suggested for inclusion by my attorney. Actually, he's just my friend, I can't afford his
legal fees." Best Letter Ever Written to a Lawyer, EDIBLE APPLE (Jan. 13, 2012),
http://www.edibleapple.com/2012/01/13/best-letter-ever-written-to-a-lawyer/.
14 Another recent example that shook up the academic world was the C & D letter sent
by Louis Vuitton to the University of Pennsylvania Law School over the use of a purselike pattern on a poster evoking Louis Vuitton's purses and advertising the Penn
Intellectual Property Group Annual Symposium whose subject this year was "Fashion
Law." See Michael Pantalony, Letter to Dean Michael A. Fitts, Feb. 29, 2012, available
at http://www.1aw.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/DropBox/lvletter.pdf (displaying the letter,
which includes a depiction of the pattern). The letter argued that the university's
egregious action is not only a serious willful infringement and
knowingly dilutes the LV Trademarks, but also may mislead others
into thinking that this type of unlawful activity is somehow "legal" or
constitutes "fair use" because the Penn Intellectual Property Group is
sponsoring a seminar on fashion law and "must be experts."
Id. at 2. The University of Pennsylvania argued that the artwork on the poster
represented a noncommercial parody that neither created confusion nor diluted Louis
Vuitton's mark. Robert F. Firestone, Letter to Michael Pantalony, March 2, 2012, at 1,
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/DropBox/pennogc letter.pdf. A
number of scholars have condemned Louis Vuitton's action. See, e.g., Michael Risch,
Really,

Louis

Vuitton?

Really?,

http://networkedblogs.com/uL4R1;

MADISONIAN.NET

(March

4,

2012),

Eugene Volokh, Penn Law School Rejects Louis

Vuitton Nastygram, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 3, 2012), http://volokh.com/2012/03/03/

penn-law-school-rejects-louis-vuitton-nastygram/. Not everyone in the legal community,
however, agrees that Louis Vuitton's actions constitute bullying. See Steve Baird, How
Fashionable is the Louis Vuitton "Trademark Bully" Label?, DUETSBLOG (Mar. 12,
http://www.duetsblog.com/2012/03/articles/trademarks/how-fashionable-is-the2012),
louis-vuitton-trademark-bully-label-2/.
15 Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1840.

FORDHAMINTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT L.J. [Vol. 22:853

858

uses private conduct as a shield to avoid the standards of conduct
and process that the judicial system imposes.
Trademark bullying is a touchy problem because the law does
require owners to police their marks if they want to maintain
exclusive rights in their marks and prevent so-called
"genericide." 1 6 Any proposal to address the problem of bullying
therefore has to avoid putting trademark owners into a double-bind
in which the lines are blurry and both failure to police and
excessively aggressive policing lead to sanctions or loss of rights.
This article will outline some of the solutions that have been
suggested in this context, including legal avenues that may
theoretically be available to address bullying but ultimately prove
inadequate, and then propose a new model of dealing with
trademark bullying that draws on the existing qualities of the PTO
while trying to circumvent its weaknesses.
This article will begin by exploring in Part I the existing
options against trademark bullying, with a particular focus on the
use of judicial sanctions and extralegal mechanisms such as
shaming. Part II will then present an alternative model that
harnesses the institutional strengths of the PTO and involves the
filing of C & D letters with the agency.
I.

EXISTING OPTIONs AGAINST TRADEMARK BULLYING

A. JudicialSanctions
One natural question that arises in the trademark bullying
context is why, if the behavior of a party or its attorney is
excessive, we would not use judicial sanctions to eradicate their
actions. Judicial sanctions can be imposed via several mechanisms

16 Scholars have criticized courts' approach to genericide and argued that the "overly
broad scope of evidence in deeming a trademark generic [ ] forces irrational behaviors on
the part of mark holders in that they must expend resources trying to persuade the media,
dictionaries, and others from making fair use of their marks." Desai & Rierson, supra
note 6, at 1855. They conclude: "Thus, mark holders waste resources trying to influence
actors over whom they have no right or ability to control (through 'education,' bullying,
and, in some cases, litigation), rather than spending those resources more efficiently
elsewhere and/or cutting the cost of their goods or services." Id.
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such as Rule 11,1 28 U.S.C. § 1927," and Section 35 of the
Lanham Act. 19 Rule 11 allows district courts to impose penalties
on either the attorney or the client in a case for pleadings filed for
an improper purpose, or for frivolous or unsupported legal
arguments.20 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, sanctions are available for
"unreasonabl[e] and vexatious[]" conduct.2 1 Section 35 of the
Lanham Act allows for the awarding of attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party in "exceptional cases." 22 Courts have traditionally
defined these as involving bad-faith conduct or willful

infringement.2 3
All of these penalties could technically be used to punish
trademark owners for policing tactics that rise to the level of
intimidation or harassment, and therefore may constitute a
potentially beneficial corrective method. Courts could strategically
deploy these sanctions against either the attorney or the client, or
both.2 4 This would allow judges to make factual determinations as
to whether the harassment was the result of a bullying client or an
overzealous attorney. Targeting the best cost avoider25 in any
given situation could optimize the incentive structure of sanctions.
This would also send a strong message to the trademark owner as
to what types of behavior will not be tolerated, thereby likely
slowing down a mark owner's attempts to unreasonably expand the
scope of his mark's protection. Similarly, attorneys would think
17
18

FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006).

19 Lanham Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (2006).
20 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1(b)-(c).
21 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2009).
22
Lanham Act § 35, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2006).
23
See, e.g., Secalt S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Constr. Mach. Co., Ltd., 2012 WL373102, at
*6 (9th Cir. Feb. 7, 2012) (citing Stephen W. Boney, Inc. v. Boney Servs., 127 F.3d 821,

827 (9th Cir. 1997)).
24 In some cases, judges favor joint and several liability between the attorney and the
client, see Alan E. Untereiner, A Uniform Approach to Rule 11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L.J.
901, 906 n.42, although some have proposed otherwise. See, e.g., Karen S. Beck, Note,
Rule 11 and Its Effects on Attorney/Client Relations, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 875, 916 (1992)
(arguing that courts should hear evidence and then determine what party should bear the
loss). I would like to thank Cassandra Robertson for the conversation that we had on this
subject.
25

See GUIDO CALABRESI,

THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS:

ANALYSIS 174-75 (1970) (defining the concept).

A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
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twice before sending aggressive C & D letters on behalf of their
clients.
While such sanctions could prove helpful against bullying in
some situations, they also entail serious disadvantages for small
business owners or individuals under attack by trademark bullies.
First, the key leverage that a trademark bully holds over her
victims is the disparity in finances that often gives her the upper
hand.2 6 Litigation can be prohibitively expensive for victims, and
the costs of litigation alone can be enough to bankrupt a small
27
To make a motion for
business even if it ultimately prevails.
judicial sanctions and obtain relief, the victim would have to
engage in litigation with the trademark bully; judicial sanctions
cannot be imposed outside of the litigation process, which is where
the majority of bullying takes place.28 In addition, judicial
sanctions have rarely been granted in trademark actions. When
they have been granted, the threshold for bad faith has been very
high, and the standards have been all but "bright-line." 29 There
also exists the non-negligible risk that the bully will appeal the
sanctions and succeed in having an appellate court overrule the
district court's ruling.3 0

Grinvald, supra note 2, at 656-57.
Id. at 653.
28 Courts can, at times, sanction extra-legal conduct under their inherent power, but it
is still conduct that occurs in the general context of litigation. Danielle Kie Hart, Happy
(?) Birthday Rule 11: And the Chill Goes on-Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs Beware:
Rule 11 Vis-6-vis 28 U.S.C. 1927 and the Court's Inherent Power, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
645, 654-55 (2004).
See, e.g., Badger Meter, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 13 F.3d 1145, 1159-60 (7th Cir.
29
1994) (defining "exceptional cases" as involving truly egregious, purposeful
infringement, or other purposeful wrongdoing); Aromatique Inc. v. Gold Seal Inc., 28
F.3d 863, 875-79 (8th Cir. 1994) (defining "exceptional cases" as ones in which the
action was groundless, unreasonable, vexatious, or pursued in bad faith); Cent. Mfg. Co.
v. Pure Fishing, Inc., 2005 WL 3090988, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (imposing sanctions
and noting that Leo Stoller had been ordered to pay attorneys' fees in at least seven cases
and had been involved in forty-nine cases in the Northern District of Illinois at that
point). Leo Stoller was eventually banned from filing any actions in the Northern District
of Illinois. Stoller v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Trust Co., No. 10 C 2028 (N.D. Ill. 2010),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/31292372/U-S-DISTRICT-COURT-BANSLEO-STOLLER.
30
For instance, the Second Circuit overturned an award of Rule 11 sanctions against a
party even though the party and its counsel had made factual representations and legal
26

27
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A further complication arises in this context from the fact that
courts are split as to the proper standard to apply to Rule 11 and
Section 1927 sanctions. Some courts employ a "bad faith"
standard, akin to contempt of court, which sets a very high
threshold and eliminates liability for careless or negligent
conduct.3 1 This high threshold could give an incentive to attorneys
not to make bona fide efforts to verify their claims, evidence, and
so on. 3 2 Some courts, however, maintain a standard that requires
"objective unreasonableness." 33 While this lower standard gives
courts greater latitude in making factual inquiries into negligent
conduct, critics have argued that it leaves attorneys vulnerable to
liability for good-faith errors, misrepresentations by clients, and
*34
arbitrary interpretation by the judiciary.
Further diluting the power of Rule 11 sanctions is its "safe
harbor" provision requiring that before an attorney can move for
sanctions, he must make a motion to opposing counsel, without
alerting the court, and provide twenty-one days for the offender to
correct her conduct before the court is notified.3 5 While this
provision is touted as a method of easing the court's burden by
allowing attorneys to self-police, the disadvantages of the
provision are apparent. Because of the confusion surrounding
sanctionable conduct, attorneys may be hesitant or unable to
distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable behavior and to

arguments that lacked a reasonable basis. Storey v. Cello Holdings, L.L.C., 347 F.3d 370,
387-93 (2d Cir. 2003).
3
See Hart, supranote 28, at 653.
32 See Sybil Dunlop, Note, Are an Empty Head and a Pure Heart Enough? Mens Rea
Standardsfor Judge-ImposedRule I1 Sanctions and their Effects on Attorney Action, 61
VAND. L. REv. 615, 626 (2008).

33 Id. at 629-31.
34 Id. at 63 5-38. For a more general discussion of reasonableness as a legal standard,
see, e.g., Alan D. Miller & Ronen Perry, The ReasonablePerson, 87 N.Y.U. L. REv. 323
(2012).
3
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). In some situations, courts have also implemented Rule II
sanctions sua sponte. For a discussion of sua sponte sanctions, see, e.g., Lucas v.
Duncan, 574 F.3d 772, 775-81 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Theodore C. Hirt, A Second Look at
Amended Rule 11, 48 Am. U. L. REv. 1007, 1035-36 (1999) (concluding that sua sponte
"rulings represent a small number of decisions relative to the number of decisions in
which courts have considered motions filed by a party.").
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take the appropriate action.36 Attorneys sometimes additionally
fail to report sanctionable behavior because they are afraid of
reprisal or because they have a tacit agreement with the opposing
counsel to look the other way.3 7 Genuine concerns also exist that
without the court's oversight, attorneys will be able to use sanction
motions as a method to delay the litigation process or as a threat to
"bully an opponent into withdrawing a paper or position."38
Another avenue of recourse against trademark bullies that has
received some attention is the use of anti-SLAPP (Strategic
These
Lawsuit Against Public Participation) regulations.3 9
regulations, which currently only exist at the state level, seek to
protect the rights to free speech and to democratic participation
against lawsuits that try to undercut such activities by forcing
defendants to spend large amounts of money on litigation.40 AntiSLAPP regulations allow defendants to expedite the litigation
process and to potentially recover their litigation costs from
plaintiffs. 4 1 The quintessential SLAPP against which such
regulations are supposed to protect has little or no likelihood of
succeeding in court and tries "to interfere with the protected free
expression of defendants." 4 2
Anti-SLAPP regulations would provide trademark defendants
with access to courts at a lower cost and with a way to recover
their costs from the plaintiff. At this time, however, they only
form a part of state, not federal law, and they are not available in

See Dunlop, supra note 32, at 644-45; see also John Lawrence Hill, A Utilitarian
Theory of Duress, 84 IOWA L. REV. 275, 326 (1999) (discussing generally the benefits of
objective standards of behavior).
3
See Dunlop, supra note 32, at 644-45.
36

3

GEORGENE M.

VAIRO,

RULE

II SANCTIONS: CASE LAW, PERSPECTIVES, AND

PREVENTATIVE MEASURES 14 (Richard G. Johnson ed., 3d ed. 2004).
3
See Eric Goldman, Why I Support HR 4364, the ProposedFederalAnti-SLAPP Bill,

ERIC GOLDMAN: TECH. & MKTG. L. BLOG (Mar. 3, 2010, 9:43 AM), http://blog.eric
goldman.org/archives/2010/03/hr_4364.htm.
40
See, e.g., FAQs About SLAPPs, PUB. PARTICIPATION PROJECT, http://www.antislapp.org/slappdash-faqs-about-slapps/ (last accessed Jan. 28, 2012).
41 See Goldman, supra note 39.
42
See, e.g., Tom Wyrwich, A Curefor a "Public Concern": Washington's New AntiSLAPP Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 663, 664 (2011) (citations omitted).
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all fifty states.4 3 Even in the states where they do exist, they can
currently only be used in federal court for cases decided under
diversity jurisdiction4 4 rather than for claims under federal law 45
(of which trademarks are a part). Additionally, a trademark bully
faced with anti-SLAPP regulations would still have the opportunity
to appeal his case and try to use the judicial system to cause the
defendant hardship. Several changes would need to take place to
increase the ability of judicial sanctions to combat trademark
First, the standard for sanctions would require
bullying.
clarification so that the recipients of C & D letters could better
evaluate their chances during litigation. Second, the courts would
need to moderate their current policies that favor trademark owners
and are rooted in the perceived obligation that owners have to
aggressively police their marks. 46 An excessively blurry line
between forceful but legitimate enforcement and bullying is bound
to render judicial sanctions ineffective. Third, courts would have
to broaden their analysis to lend greater weight to bad-faith
conduct that takes place prior to litigation, such as improper C & D
Because these
letters and extortionist settlement demands.
sanctions currently focus on conduct during litigation, the victim
must initiate court proceedings to gain redress. It is easy for
bullies to intimidate victims in the private sphere, where a
significant proportion of bullying occurs.
Recognizing that illegitimate actions generally take place
before litigation and acknowledging that trademark owners will at
times minimize record-keeping of their improper enforcement
attempts would represent an important step in protecting the
victims of bullying.4 7 Such a change could potentially also include
shifting the target of sanctions from the attorney to the client if it is
Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 1641, 1685 n.195 (2011)
(putting the number at a bit more than half of all states) (citation omitted).
4
See, e.g., United States v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970-73
(9th Cir. 1999) (applying California's anti-SLAPP statute in a diversity case).
45
Ginx, Inc. v. Soho Alliance, 720 F. Supp. 2d 342, 366 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) ("No federal
court of which [the court is] aware has ever awarded anti-SLAPP sanctions because of a
federal claim in a federal forum.").
46
Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1835.
47 William E. Ridgway, Revitalizing the Doctrine of Trademark Misuse, 21 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1547, 1569 (2006).
43
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the client that is primarily responsible for initiating the excessive
enforcement attempts. Finally, the legislature could play a role by
removing the "safe harbor" provision of Rule 11 and either
clarifying the intended use of sanctions or specifying the mens rea
48
Some legislative proposals have
required under the law.
attempted to make changes to Rule 11, but none has been enacted
yet. 49
Ultimately, while these changes could benefit the victims of
trademark bullying, their costs may be too high to warrant
implementation. Lowering the threshold for judicial sanctions may
conflict with the greater legal policy of zealous representation of
clients.
Barring a tectonic shift in trademark law and an
unprecedented clarification of the standards for proper mark
policing, attorneys could find themselves in difficult positions and
be subject to disciplinary measures either for aggressive
representation or, alternatively, for deficient representation if rights
51
Changing
to a mark are eventually lost as a result of genericide.
the focus of sanctions from attorneys to clients is problematic as
well. After all, clients are presumed to lack sophistication in legal
matters and to rely on their attorneys for advice. Attorneys rather
than clients are generally in the best position to assess whether
enforcement conduct is likely to be improper and to advise
accordingly. Attorneys also have to make decisions during trials
that do not always allow for extensive conferrals with clients, so it
would add numerous complications to sanction clients or apportion
blame precisely between attorneys and clients. Hence, even if the
political and judicial wills were sufficient to impose changes in the
48

STEPHEN B. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT

TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 10-19 (1989) (stating that courts

disagree on the proper standard).
49 See, e.g., Ann M. Odelson & Timothy B. Parlin, Proposal to Amend Rule 11
Introduced in Congress, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 2, 2011, available at http://www.newyork
(describing recent
lawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202513143784&slreturn=I
proposals to eliminate the safe harbor and make other changes).
50
See, e.g., Carl Tobias, The TransmittalLetter Translated,46 FLA. L. REv. 127, 131
(1994) (discussing the need to protect attorneys' ability to engage in zealous advocacy
when policymakers determine the rules for sanctions).
sI
Desai & Rierson, supra note 6, at 1794-97 (describing the pressure on practitioners
to aggressively protect marks based on the tremendous value that marks can have, and the
legal implications that can arise from failing to protect a brand).
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realm of judicial sanctions, the undesirable consequences are of
sufficient magnitude that they should give us pause and encourage
consideration of other alternatives.
B. Extralegal Measures
With the proliferation of social media on the Internet, the
victims of bullying have obtained increased access to resources
and can fight bullying without resorting to legal measures. One
tool to combat bullies in this context has been the use of social
media to make bullies' behavior the subject of public criticism and
to shame them into ceasing their activities. Shaming can prove
helpful in the trademark context because the costs of shaming are
minimal while the punitive effects can have a lasting impact.
Trademark owners generally rely on their public reputations for
commercial success, and thus a shaming campaign exposing an
owner as a bully can have significant repercussions for the owner's
business. There are numerous stories in which individuals or small
businesses were able to triumph over giant corporations this way.52
The threshold for shaming is also much lower than it is for judicial
sanctions, and the task is fairly clear: the victim has to convince
the public that the bully has violated social and legal norms
through his behavior. 53
Shaming, however, is not without its downsides. Its effect
could suffer dilution through overuse if some parties try to employ
it excessively and in an illegitimate manner. Because shaming is
essentially a private form of conduct that is unregulated by the
courts or similar entities, there is no consistent way to prevent
abusers of the technique from weakening its power. 54 Shaming
also still requires the victim to respond to the bully in a negative
manner, which may invoke litigation from the bully who expects
capitulation rather than resistance. Furthermore, shamers could
For example, Rock Art Brewery successfully used Internet shaming against the
multi-million dollar company Hansen Beverage when the latter started a C & D campaign
regarding use of the term "Vermonster" in the context of beer sales. See Grinvald, supra
note 2, at 671-74.
5 Id. at 670-72; see also Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U.
CHi. L. REv. 591, 636 (1996) (explaining that shaming serves to "denounce the wrong
doer and his conduct as contrary to shared moral norms").
54 See Grinvald, supra note 2, at 680-81.
52
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face defamation lawsuits. 5 The situation could escape the victim's
control as the public or the media run away with a controversy. A
negative impact against the victim could result if she has reached
an agreement with the bully and is seeking to withdraw from or
end the shaming campaign.
Some mechanisms could improve the effectiveness and smooth
functioning of shaming in this context. For instance, we could
make greater use of websites that monitor the veracity of shaming
claims and could thus hopefully weed out a portion of abusers.
Such websites could also serve as a centralized sounding board for
dispute resolution such that once the parties have resolved their
conflict and the victim wishes to cease its public campaign, the
website can alert the public to the resolution, which might then
discontinue the shaming. While the use of online tools can serve a
critical role in providing information to victims 5 6 and giving them
access to retaliatory measures, the bullies are often so powerful
that the effect may not prove strong enough. In some cases,
victims may also not be aware of the resources that exist for their
protection and could cave before even making efforts to retaliate.
II. THE ALTERNATIVE OF A PTO PARADIGM

The time may be ripe to consider adopting an altogether
different model to combat trademark bullying. I will sketch here a
proposal that tries to alleviate the problem of bullying and
simultaneously maintain procedural safeguards as well as enable
mark owners to properly police their marks. The idea would be to
create a new mechanism through the PTO that would balance the
large company's duty to police and the individual's or small
business' right to compete without unfair harassment. The PTO
could offer an oversight process that would allow agency attorneys
to review C & D letters and issue rulings on the merits of the

"

Id. at 682-83.
This is a key function of the Chilling Effects website, but its existence has certainly
not extinguished trademark bullying. See CHILLING EFFECTS, http://chillingeffects.org/
(last visited Jan. 28, 2012).
56
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alleged infringement.57 This would benefit both the trademark
owner and the potential bullying victim. The initial requirement
would be the filing of the C & D letter with the PTO. The primary
purpose of that requirement is to impose some cost on the
trademark owner to incentivize him to make careful choices as to
when to attempt to enforce his mark.
The process would begin by having the mark owner file the
letter, along with a fee determined by the PTO. The fee would
have to cover the operating expenses of this mechanism and
therefore would likely be more than simply nominal. The
trademark owner would also have the option of filing additional
supporting evidence. The documentation would then be sent to the
alleged infringer, who would have the opportunity to respond. A
PTO attorney would analyze the alleged infringement and
determine whether legal action by the trademark owner would
have merit.
If the PTO decides that infringement took place, the trademark
owner could proceed either with private settlement negotiations or
he could pursue litigation. Similar to how trademark registrations
carry a presumption of validity,58 the declaration by the PTO
would be treated as a presumption of infringement by courts.
Further, if he is ultimately successful, part of the trademark
owner's recovery could include his PTO filing fees, thus negating
possible chilling effects that the costs might have on valid
enforcement actions. If the PTO determines that the accusation is
unfounded, the victim could use this to establish a presumption of
improper conduct in court if further enforcement tactics are
employed. This may lower the uncertainty otherwise provided by
litigation and partially alleviate the burden to "litigate or
capitulate" that defendants currently face.
Trademark owners could continue to send C & D letters
without following the PTO procedure. The way I envision the
57

This model contains some parallels to my previous work, in particular to a proposal
to consider using judges to clear trademark infringement surveys before they are
conducted. See generally Irina D. Manta, In Search of Validity: A New Model for the
Content and Procedural Treatment of Trademark Infringement Surveys, 24 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1027 (2007).
58 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2006).
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system is that there would exist a threshold value of a mark above
which certain requirements would kick in for owners when they
send a letter directly to an alleged infringer. 59 Mark owners would
have to add a boilerplate statement indicating that they are or are
not also filing the letter with the PTO, and cite the relevant statutes
and regulations that cover the practice. With these rules in place,
there are three possible scenarios. First, the owner may fail to
include the statement. In that case, the letter would not count later
if courts ever examine whether the owner properly policed his
mark. If he sues the person to whom he sent the letter, his failure
to include the statement would also be construed during litigation
as bad faith on his part.60 Second, the owner could state that he is
additionally filing the letter with the PTO. This would qualify as
evidence of policing and serve as an information-forcing
mechanism to show his good faith about his legal claims. The
recipient would be on notice and know to take this type of letter
seriously. Third, the owner could state that he is not filing the
letter with the PTO. If that is the case, the letter will not qualify as
evidence of policing down the line. The recipient of the letter may
be less intimidated and could decide to force a conflict if he feels
that he is in the right and the senior user is less than serious about
his claims. Owners of less valuable marks would not be required
to file the letter with the PTO (although they would have the option
One could object that mark owners might have an incentive to fudge the valuations
of their marks down the line if there was a dispute as to whether they are obligated to
meet the new requirements of PTO filings. The fact that the recovery of damages is
directly tied to mark value, however, would provide them with a strong disincentive from
doing so, especially because they would have difficulty providing inconsistent figures
across different lawsuits without being accused of bad faith should they actually be
tempted to do so. For a discussion of how the value of brands is determined, see, James
T. Berger & Diana Tadzijeva, Marketing Perspectives on Brand Valuation,
5

JAMESBERGER.NET,

http://www.jamesberger.net/BrandValuationMethods.shtml

(last

visited Feb. 5, 2012).
60 Similarly, placing phone calls that constitute the substantive equivalents of C & D
letters would be construed as bad faith if litigation does proceed. Some attorneys
currently advise their clients to use the phone precisely because it avoids the creation of a
record. See, e.g., Geri Haight, Trademark Enforcement, Trademark "Bullies" and Social
Media,

COPYRIGHT

&

TRADEMARK

MATTERS

(Dec.

5,

2011),

http://www.copyrighttrademarkmatters.com/2011/12/05/trademark-enforcementtrade
mark-bullies-and-social-medial ("When in doubt, pick up the phone. A one-on-one
conversation may be an effective way to resolve the issue amicably-without creating a
paper trail.").
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of doing so) and/or make related statements in C & D letters
because imposing the costs on such owners to go through the PTO
may be excessive, and bullying concerns are already reduced with
these types of parties.
Trademark owners would receive additional benefits beyond
the power of a determination of validity from the PTO procedure.
A significant amount of trademark bullying stems from bullies'
impression that to maintain a mark, it is the owner's duty to
aggressively police it. Thus, many bullying situations involve
mark owners who have taken this perceived duty to extreme
levels.61 By permitting the filing of C & D letters to serve as
evidence of policing the mark, the trademark owner will be
relieved of that burden and hopefully incentivized to make more
careful decisions as to when to pursue enforcement actions.
One of the key advantages of the PTO regulation system will
be the reduction of private trademark bullying, as the mark owner
will most likely review the merits of an enforcement action before
incurring the costs of filing a C & D letter. If he is pursuing a
legitimate claim, the owner will likely recover those costs later and
receive other procedural benefits from having filed the letter. The
recipients of C & D letters would receive protection through the
oversight of the PTO and the disincentives against bullying that the
new system would provide. Recipients would also be able to
perform a search of pre-existing PTO decisions if the agency
The
places them online like it does trademark registrations.6
average alleged infringer will likely find that these records are
easier to search and understand than the results he is likely to
obtain by searching judicial decisions in databases such as
Westlaw, LexisNexis, or PACER, not to mention much more
inexpensive to gather.6 3
For example, Warner Brothers was embarrassed to find out that it had sent a letter to
a 15-year-old girl demanding that she take down her Harry Potter fan site. Kieren
McCarthy, Warner Bros Backs Down on HarryPotter Web Site, THE REGISTER (Dec. 15,
2000), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2000/12/15/warnerbros-backs-down/.
61

62

See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, Trademark Electronic Search System

0 2
(TESS), USPTO.Gov, http://tess2.uspto.gov/bin/gate.exe?f-tess&state-4 0 :v0fmtn.1.1
(last visited Jan. 29, 2012).
63 Id. The TESS system is free to use (meaning that it is agency-funded, but the cost to
the agency of this new task would likely be trivial).
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This proposal certainly contains drawbacks as well. There
would be significant administrative and set-up costs, which could
result in filing fees high enough to reduce valid enforcement
In addition, the program would require effective
attempts.
enforcement by the courts and the PTO. If a PTO determination
represents a near-certain victory for a trademark owner, his
settlement demands could become unreasonable and force the
alleged infringer to accept litigation as the only means of
protection. Critics may also argue that the PTO will essentially be
required to act as a court and that it will be forced to hire more
attorneys to undertake this work. These additional salaries would
further increase the filing fees and could have a chilling effect on
some legitimate claims. At the same time, the PTO already
conducts likelihood of confusion analyses as part of the trademark
registration process and is thus just as equipped to handle this task
as that of registration. 64 The additional costs should not prove
insurmountable and the current registration system should not be
unduly burdened.
Trademark owners may also argue that imposing PTO
regulation on the enforcement process will in effect impose further
costs for owners aside from the filing fees. The mark owners may
claim that instead of merely issuing C & D letters, which are
relatively inexpensive to prepare, owners will now have to engage
their lawyers in costly in-depth infringement analyses, in the face
of somewhat undefined case law.
These cost impositions,
however, would most likely not be prohibitive and in fact comport
with general trademark policy. As PTO decisions on C & D letters
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the PTO is, as I have previously stated, in need
of reform to speed up and potentially improve its processing of claims. See generally
Irina D. Manta, Privatizing Trademarks, 51 ARIz. L. REv. 381 (2009) (proposing the
targeted use of private actors to assist in the trademark registration process). Some critics
argue that the PTO is not equipped to deal with determining real-world usage and
infringement and that an entity like the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)
or National Arbitration Forum (NAF) would be better suited for this task. While I
believe that my proposal would provide a sensible integration with the current duties of
the PTO, these are alternatives worth exploring once more extensive empirical research
on the issue takes place. At that stage, part of the focus may also turn toward the possible
role of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) in any new procedures given the
TTAB's existing involvement in trademark registration opposition proceedings. I would
like to thank Eric Goldman and David Silverman for their comments on this subject.
6
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are issued, these rulings will provide information as to how owners
should interpret trademark law and, as indicated above, will
potentially be easier to interpret than court decisions on the
subject. The cost and uncertainty of legitimate enforcement could
therefore actually decrease.65
CONCLUSION
The problem of trademark bullying is tricky but perhaps not
entirely intractable. This area of the law remains an outlier in the
sense that we do not normally expect such a high level of assertive
policing and initiation of legal actions for owners to maintain their
rights as we do for trademarks. Changes in the implementation of
judicial sanctions and mechanisms such as shaming could alleviate
some of the problems associated with bullying, but are likely to
leave significant gaps. Public interest organizations will perhaps
increase their outreach and provide greater legal representation to
the victims of bullying, although this would require focused
attention and financial resources. This article proposes a new
paradigm to handle the tension between allowing owners to police
their marks and preventing them from harassing competitors and
silencing speech. While substantive changes in the law will
hopefully clarify the line between legitimate and improper
enforcement, the time may have come to consider new procedural
safeguards as well. The proposal delineated here certainly requires
significant further research before its final implementation,
including detailed empirical study of the financial costs and
benefits. My goal was to advance the conversation by offering
another possible instrument in the toolbox at our disposal to fix a
system in need of more than just tinkering.
As this article was going to press, a bill entitled "Small Business Trademark
Protection Act" was introduced into the Minnesota State House with the goal of
combating trademark bullying, in part through a requirement that all C & D letters
include language advising recipients of their right to a settlement conference. See Steve
Baird, Minnesota's Legislative Answer to "Trademark Bullying"?, DUETSBLOG (Apr. 9,
http://www.jdsupra.com/post/documentViewer.aspx?fid=1bIeldda-5c6f-42852012),
9254-25d2c757cl05. While my proposal is ultimately quite different from that in this
bill, the idea to require specific language in C & D letters and involve administrative
actors into the pre-litigation process mirror some of the notions presented in this article.
See id.
65
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